1. There were notable ‘outposts’ of Continental thought in the States, such as Yale University and Stony Book University. See Ihde (1986) for an introduction.

2.Binford (1989:ch2) discusses the paradox of ‘traditional archaeology’ with its Boasian concept of culture, one which is ‘in the heads’ of past individuals, yet its commitment to ‘strict empiricism’ and so a search for a causality limited to the directly observable record. In his criticism of ‘behavioral archaeology’, or ‘reconstructionism’, he discerns the canceling-out effect of a movement away from a Boasian, ideational concept of culture (towards materialism) concomitant with a regression back to ‘strict empiricism’ and disavowal of non-trivial generalizations (ibid: 42-6).

3. Kuhn’s criteria for describing the stages of disciplinarian change as well as his idea of ‘incommensurability’ between ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ science has been heavily critiqued both by archaeologists and philosophers (for extended treatment in archaeology see (Kelley 1988). For the definitive critique in philosophy, see (Davidson 1974).

4. Such as shift was more apparent in North America where archaeology was historically aligned with anthropology as opposed to history in the UK and Europe.

5. Relativism in general is understood as a denial that there can be foundational grounds for establishing universal truths. Philosophers canonically distinguish two principle varieties: cognitive relativism (sometimes referred to as ‘epistemic relativism’), the claim that there are no universal truths concerning the world, only varying interpretations; and ethical relativism, which holds that there are no universally valid moral principles which stand outside of cultural or individual choice. A host of subsidiary positions result from these primary categories of relativism, including ‘judgmental relativism’, ‘conventionalism’, ‘subjectivism’, ‘constructivism’ and so forth (Audi 2001).

6. These concerns were vocalized in the discussion forum of Reconstructing Archaeology and Social Theory and Archaeology convened for Norwegian Archaeological Review 22(1) 1989. Renfrew (1989:33-41) was particularly perceptive in articulating these worries in his discussion of Shanks and Tilley’s project which “. . .is vitiated by the shaky epistemology upon which it is founded” (ibid:37).

7. Unlike the fuller studies of the historical and intellectual cross-fertilization between archaeology and philosophy of science and related traditions in analytic philosophy (e.g. Gibbon 1989, Kelley and Hanen 1988, Trigger 1989, 2003, Wylie 2002) there stands no account of the more recent incorporation of the ‘Continental Tradition’ of philosophy in archaeology. Unfortunately, while a broad and arguably ‘orthodox’ segment of archaeology now operates according to its informing ideas (eg. much of the ‘postprocessual push’ and social archaeology) , there is insufficient room to treat the inter-relationship in detail here. Such a broad and historical account, explicating the various thinkers in relation to their importance for archaeological practice, would be an important contribution to the established inter-field of ‘metaarchaeology’ (see http://traumwerk.stanford.edu/metaarch).

8. While not discussed in explicit regard to Popper’s influence in archaeology, the conciliatory arguments for processual and postprocessual approaches (eg. Van Pool and Van Pool 1999, 2003) could be pursued in relation to Hodder’s ‘fitting’ procedure.

9. Donald Davidson (1983), ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’, in D. Henrich (ed.), Kant oder Hegel?, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, provided the most influential argument for a combined coherency-correspondence theory of knowledge. Subsequently in his ‘afterword’ (2001:154-7) to the original essay, he modified his original remarks by accommodating the pragmatic considerations posed by Richard Rorty. His conclusion was that both coherence and correspondence notions of justification were fundamentally incapable of providing more than ‘warranted assertability’.

10. Most likely the lack of attention to pragmatism came as a result of following secondary literature, such as his sourcing of A.J. Ayer who, as a key member of the logical positivists, helped to establish Analytic philosophy as the dominant program in Anglo-American philosophy. Transplanted to the States by Hempel and Carnap, the program eclipsed and effectively replaced the once influential place of pragmatist thought for the middle half of the 20th-century (for an historical account, see Dickstein 1998).