Bergsonian and Deleuzian ontologies for a posthuman archaeology. Polyagentive archaeology, Part III
Can we rely on materialities, objects or humans in archaeological analyses? What should our basic categories of analysis be? What do the humans and non-humans share that make them create a network? Symmetrical archaeology suggests that we should not give primacy to the human while we study archaeological remains. To this I agree (Normark 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2006a, 2006b). However, there is still the problem of defining entities; human or non-human alike. When we define entities, we take them out of their own becoming and we make them static. Humanocentric archaeologists believe that the events of the past are gone and that the materialities persist (see for example Olivier 2004). This is true to some extent, but is a broken vessel the same object as when it was a complete vessel? What is it that lasts? Clearly not the physical and chemical characteristics of materiality. The crucial but simple question for polyagentive archaeology is: what existed in relation to the past vessel before it broke into sherds, which also exist in the present sherds? In short; what can differentiate from within and still be a unity without adding an external transcendental quasi-object such as culture or practice or an essential form? We need to raise the level of abstraction and elaborate upon the idea of an ontology of virtuality (Bergson 1998, 2001, 2004; Deleuze 1991, 1994; Deleuze and Guattari 1988; Grosz 1999, 2004, 2005; Pearson 1999, 2002).
Ontology concerns the entities that is believed to exist and that populate reality. DeLanda classifies the ontologies into three main groups. Some believe that there is no reality beyond the human mind (“idealism”). Others believe that the objects we observe do exist beyond us but they are sceptical to the idea that theories are independent from social constructions. A third group believes that there is a world completely independent from the human mind. The two first perspectives deal with phenomena (the way things appear in our mind), and the latter also discuss nuomena (the things in themselves). This latter ontology is a realist ontology to which Deleuze belongs (DeLanda 2000a, 2000b). However, Deleuze does not believe in essences or transcendental entities like the “naïve realists” do (DeLanda 2000b:1).
Deleuze/DeLanda creates a flat ontology in which the ontological differences are reduced to an ontology concerning emergent property. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts which makes it impossible to reduce the whole to the parts. By this is meant that the human being cannot be reduced to biology, biology cannot be reduced to chemistry, chemistry cannot be reduced to physics and physics cannot be reduced to mathematics. Deleuze flattens all the distinctions above into a virtual plane of consistency/immanence in which there is no opposition. The plane of immanence is pure immanence. Therefore, it has no substantial division, it is immanent only to itself. Immanence is substance itself. This also means that the mind is not separated from the bodily substance. The plane of immanence is a formless self-organizing process that diverges from itself and, on top of this plane, a rhizomatic network is formed (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:266).
A concept used in research should not be an empty form that needs to be filled with some transcendent content, such as a predefined quasi-object like the “Classic period Maya culture” that is filled with Long Count calendars, ballcourts, pyramids, stelae, etc. The lack of these entities would become an anomaly in humanocentric archaeology. The concepts should rather be affected by other concepts, bodies, etc. There is no need for transcendent concepts that explains what is beyond the immediate. This is because immanence is not just within, but also upon and of. A building is not just within a larger polyagentive network, it is formed from the network. A building functions and operates upon and through the network (DeLanda 2000b).




